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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
NEAL R. MORRIS, doing buiness as
MARIAN DELIVERY SERVICE,
and ROBERT W. WATSON, doing
business as BOB WATSON MOVING,
Plaintiffs,

vs.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
UTAH, HAL S. BENNETT, DONALD H A C K I N G, JESSE R. S.
BUDGE, Its Commissioners; BRUCE
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COMPANY, MOLLERUP MOVING
& STORAGE COMPANY, OVERLAND MOVING COMPANY, and
SUGARHOUSE VAN LINES,

No 8696

Defendants.

DEFENDANTS' BRIEF
ST~TEMENT

OF FACTS
Defendants answering the Brief of the appellants hereby adopt generally the statement of facts
as set forth therein, with the following additions.
Mr. Watson testified in addition that he had
sold his only truck (R. 139) and had cancelled his
insurance on the motor carrier operation (R. 140).
1
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Then as to the reasons for the purported reactivation of operations he testified, (R. 142) "Q. Now,
the reason you asked for your permit to be reactivated or your certificate was for the purpose of
consummating this sale, was it not?
In other words, you had asked the Commission
to approve the sale of your rights to Mr. Morris.
A.

Yes.

Q.

That was the reason you asked that -

A.

Yes.

Q.

- the suspension be revoked.

A.

Yes.

Q. Otherwise you were still in a position so
far as your health was concerned, that. you couldn't
operate this business yourself?
A.

'That's right.

Q.

You didn't intend to operate it yourself?

A.

No.

Q. And you didn't reactivate these for the purpose of anyone else operating it except Mr. Morris;
isn't that correct?
A.

That's right." (R. 142)

Further he testified that he had no record of
the one alleged haul of an appliance that he claimed
2
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to have made with Mr. Morris and stated also, (R.
143)
BY MR. ADAMS:

Q. Mr. Watson, if this - if the Commission
didn't allow Mr. Morris to assume your rights,
vvould you ask that your certificate of convenience
be suspended again?
MR. WORSLEY: I object to that as immaterial and argumentative.
COM. HACKING:

Well, it may be helpful.

The witness may answer.
I suppose what the question is, Mr. Watson:
If this application isn't granted, what will you
do with your rights?
A. Well, I would try to dispose of them to
someone else.

Q. You wouldn't attempt to carry them on
yourself?
A.

No." (R. 143)
STATEMENT OF POINTS

POINT I
THERE IS COMPETENT AND SUFFICIENT MATERIAL EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT
THE FINDINGS AND ORDER OF THE COMMISSION.
3
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POINT II
THE ABANDONMENT OF OPERATIONS BY MR.
WATSON SUBJECTED HIS AUTHORITY TO CANCELLATION AND THE COMMISSION HAD JURISDICTION TO CANCEL SUCH.
POINT III
APPLICANTS BOTH KNEW THAT IN THESE
"TRANSFER" MATTERS THE COMMISSION MUST
NECESSARILY CANCEL THE OLD AUTHORITY AS
A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO ANY POSSIBLE ISSUE OF A NEW CERTIFICATE, SO THEIR ATTENDANCE AT AND PARTICIPATION IN THE PROCEEDINGS WAIVED ANY NEED FOR A SPECIAL NOTICE
THAT THE OLD RIGHTS MIGHT BE CANCELLED.
POINT IV
THE ORDER DENYING THE PROPOSED TRANSFER OF OPERATING RIGHTS IS SUPPORTED BY
COl\IPETENT AND ADEQUATE EVIDENCE.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE IS COMPETENT AND SUFFICIENT MATERIAL EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT
THE FINDINGS AND ORDER OF THE COMMISSION.
POINT II
THE ABANDONMENT OF OPERATIONS BY MR.
WATSON SUBJECTED HIS AUTHORITY TO CANCELLATION AND THE COMMISSION HAD JURISDICTION TO CANCEL SUCH.

The Public Service Commission is vested with
numerous responsibilities and powers and must exercise such in the public good. Neither it nor the
Legislature have permitted the sale or transfer of
4
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motor carrier operating rights. The issue of public
convenience and necessity is paramount when the
so-called "transfer" cases come before the Commission.
Through the procedure of cancelling the old
authority and issuing a new certificate to the new
operator, the Commission has effectively sanctioned
transfers of operating authority. It has not been
required that new proof of public convenience and
necessity be adduced where the vendor was actively
engaged in the transporting of commodities for hire
in Utah. The fact of such active operations has been
deemed by the Commission in the past as good and
sufficient proof of a need for a continuation of the
same service by the vendee.
In the present case, no such active operational
status existed. The transcript shows that prior to
December of 1955 he stopped operations and on
December 3rd applied to the Commission for suspension of operations. He continued inactive, sold
his truck, cancelled his insurance and performed
no service until Mr. Morris induced him to sign a
contract for the sale of the rights for $200.00. Then
he was induced, by Mr. Morris's offer of purchase, ·
to apply for resumption of service. This was in
August of 1956.
At pages 142-143 of the record, Mr. Watson
admitted that the only reason for requesting restor5
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a tion of his rights was to enable him to peddle them
to Mr. Morris and that he, Mr. Watson, had no intention whatsoever of personally operating or serving the public. And if this application is not granted,
he will not operate as a carrier, but will try to sell
to someone else.
Based upon this and other evidence in the
record it was found that the said Watson rights
were "inactive" and "dead". Can anyone dispute
that there was adequate, competent evidence in the
record to support such a finding? The volume of
evidence is not material on this point in an appeal.
However, the testimony given by Mr. Watson himself was plain and adequate to sustain the said findings of the Commission.
On earlier proceedings of this nature your court
has announced the rule to be that if there is any
evidence to support the findings by the Commission,
then your court will not interject itself to weigh
and analyze that evidence, nor substitute its judgment for that of the Commission which has seen
and heard the witnesses.
Two pertinent cases dealing with the scope of
review are: Los Angeles & Salt Lake R. Co. v.
Public Service Commission, 121 Utah 209, 240 Pac
(2d) 493 and Ashworth Transfer Company v. Public Service Commission, 2 Utah (2d) 23, 268 Pac
( 2d) 990. In the first case your court said that the
6
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pDwer of review is limited to whether the Commission could reasonably find as it rlid from the evidence adduced. The decision then cited the statute,
now 54-7-16, U.C.A. 1953 which states: "The findings and conclusions of the Commission on questions
of fact shall be final and not subject to review."
In the Ashworth case your court stated:
"On review of an order of the Public
Service Commission of Utah granting a certificate of convenience and necessity, it is not
required that facts found by the Commission
be conclusively established or shown by a preponderance of the evidence. The scope of review is limited to an ascertainment of whether
the Commission had before it competent evidence upon which to base its decision. U.C.A.
1953, 54-7-16; Wycoff Co., Inc. v. Public Service Commission, Utah, 227 P. 2d 323; Uintah
Freight Lines v. Public Service Commission,
Utah, 229 P. 2d 675."
The plaintiffs cannot complain as to the competency of the evidence on the question of dormancy
of Watson's rights because they were the witnesses
from whoE1 the evidence came. Granted, that some
statements were also made indicating a half-hearted
effort to operate after the Morris contract of purchase was made. However, the Commissioners after
seeing the witnesses and hearing them chose to
believe and find that:
''The evidence in this case discloses that
the certificate of Watson was completely in7
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active for several months. There is no evidence
that the public suffered from any lack of
carrier service during this period. The evidence clearly shows that the sole purpose of
reactivating the Watson certificate was for
the purpose of selling said certificate. In his
application for reinstatement of Certificate
of Convenience and Necessity No. 833 filed
with the Commission on August 14, 1956,
Watson alleged that "As of the date hereof,
however, your petitioner has available trucks,
motorcycles and other equipment, together
with trained personnel to properly and adequately conduct all operations authorized under said Certificate of Convenience and Necessity, is financially able to do so, and therefore requests the Commission that its Order
of December 13, 1955, be set aside and annulled." It is clear from the evidence that
Watson never intended to personally operate
his certificate of convenience and necessity
and that the arrangement for equipment and
financing as above set forth was with Morris
as the prospective purchaser of Certificate of
Convenience and Necessity No. 833.
"4. We are of the view that the rules of
this Commission as above set forth with respect to the transferring of an authorized
operation of a retiring carrier to a new carrier
are proper, reasonable and legal. We do not
believe, however, that the laws of the State
of Utah contemplate that an inactive certificate and a service once dead should be resurrected merely for the purpose of selling the
certificate. Such procedure, if approved by
this Commission, would in our opinion be entirely repugnant to the provisions of the Motor
Carrier Act.'' (R. 22)
8
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POINT III
APPLICANTS BOTH KNEW THAT IN THESE
"TRANSFER" MATTERS THE COMMISSION MUST
NECESSARILY CANCEL THE OLD AUTHORITY AS
A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO ANY POSSIBLE ISSUE OF A NEW CERTIFICATE, SO THEIR ATTENDANCE AT AND PARTICIPATION IN THE PROCEEDINGS WAIVED ANY NEED FOR A SPECIAL NOTICE
THAT THE OLD RIGHTS MIGHT BE CANCELLED.

The application as presented (R. 1) was clearly a request that Morris "assume the operating
rights" of Watson or as stated in the body, "perform
the same operating authority" as evidenced by the
Watson certificate. The notice of hearing set out
similar phrases and both Mr. Morris and Mr. Watson were present at the hearing. Both were represented by competent legal counsel.
Each party to the matter was an experienced
motor carrier, presumably aware of the statutes relating to "transfers" of rights. It is common knowledge that the "transfer" involves a cancellation of
the vendor's rights and a request for a new certificate in the name of the vendee.
The Rules of Practice and Procedure published
by the Commission Sept. 6, 1939, Section 21.3 provides:
"Section 21.3 TRANSFER OF OPERATING RIGHTS: The Commission will not
permit the transfer or assignment of operating rights granted by it. Any bona fide purchaser of an option on the operating rights of
9
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any person under the jurisdiction of the Commission may make application to the Commission for a grant of such rights. The granting
of such rights will be discretionary with the
Commission.''
In the face of this, the parties applied to the
Commission and submitted their positions to its
jurisdiction for action. Perhaps the calculated risk
of having the Watson rights cancelled out was well
known as the consideration for the rights was only
$200.00. Had the operating authority been active
and had Mr. Watson preserved his rights, the same
would have had a much greater value.
No separate proceeding is requisite to due process of law when the only two affected parties to the
contract, Watson and Morris are personally before
the Commission and represented by counsel. We are
at a loss to know what different testimony would
have been given by Mr. Watson had a different type
notice been sent to him. He and counsel well knew
that the first issue was the cancellation of his
authority. They both knew of the dormancy thereof.
In the Provo Transfer & Storage Co. v. Public
Service Commission case, 3 Utah ( 2d) 86, 287 Pac.
(2d) 985 your court confirmed the right of the Commission to cancel and revoke a carriers operating
authority in connection with a proposed transfer
through an acquisition of stock. This decision reads
in part:
10
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"Petitioner argues that Sec. 54-6-20
should be construed as a narrow grant of discretionary power to the Commission as otherwise "no security of operation could be had by
any motor carrier, and each would be subject
to the whim of the succeeding members of the
Public Service Commission." It is further
asserted that "an administrative body such as
the Public Service Commission cannot be a
law unto itself in all things and arbitrarily
take f1'0m the carrier its certificate, as a
public utility has a substantial interest in the
operation and should not without due process
of law be deprived of its valuable property
right without just and substantial cause being shown." C01nplaint is made that no standards were established by the Legislature as
a guide to the Commission in the revocation
or suspension of operating authority and it is
asserted that the remedy in this case should be
the initiation of the criminal proceeding contemplated by 54-6-18, U.C.A., 1953. No precedent is submitted in support of this argument.
"We do not sit in these certiorari proceedings to determine whether the action taken by the Commission is exactly to our liking.
Suffice it to say that it appears that the Legislature has vested in this administrative tribunal plenary powers to revoke and suspend
certificates of convenience, for good cause,
and where it appears, as in the present case,
that one motor carrier, in violation of the
statute, purchased stock in another motor
carrier and then proceeded to take over and
operate the freight department of the corporation bought into without the consent of
the Commission, we are not prepared to hold
11
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that good cause for the revocation of the
carrier's certificate has not been shown."
Upon that precedent alone, it is fair to assume
that the Court will affirm the decision of the Commission in the instant case. Due process of law has
been met by the personal appearances of Mr. Watson and Mr. Morris, their free and unhampered
testimony and their representation by counsel before
the Commission.
POINT IV
THE ORDER DENYING THE PROPOSED TRANSFER OF OPERATING RIGHTS IS SUPPORTED BY
COMPETENT AND ADEQUATE EVIDENCE.

The need for findings on the financial ability,
experience and fitness of applicant, Morris, presupposes an absolute right of transfer of the operating rights from Watson to Morris. No findings as
to fitness were required as the Commission found
that it was not in the public interest to continue the
dormant operations.
It is entirely consistent for the Commission to
block this transaction as it has long taken a position
that the best interests of the public are the first
consideration. Trafficing in certificates has never
been approved by it. The bargain between these two
parties was squarely in the face of the Commission's
rule quoted above which states that the Commission
will not permit a transfer.
12
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How has Mr. Morris been prejudiced by the absence of a specific finding as to his fitness to operate? Had he been the largest and most affluent carrier in the United States, still in this instance no
prejudice would result on the failure of the commission to recite his fitness. If no rights were to be
issued to him (because of the dormancy and inactivity of the vendor) no further findings were material.
Defendants submit that the Report and Order
of the Commission should be sustained by the Court.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER, JR.
Attorney General of Utah
For Defendants,
Public Service Commission of Utah
Hal S. Bennett, Donald Hacking and
JesseR. S. Budge, Its Commissioners
HARRY D. PUGSLEY, of
PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTON
Attorney for Defendants,
Hadley Transfer & Storage Company
Mollerup Moving & Storage Company
Overland Moving Company
Sugarhouse Van Lines
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